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PROLOGUE
TSUBMITTED the original "final draft" of this article on Janu-
ary 21, 2000 as my final paper for a course titled "The Law of
International Armed Conflict" taught by Prof. (Col.) William K.
Lietzau in the graduate program at the Georgetown University
Law Center. Given the sparse writings on the subject, Prof. Liet-
zau commented that I might pursue having it published and fol-
lowing graduation inJanuary 2001, I did just that. Work, falling
in love, and other of life's diversions delayed the effort a bit.
Nevertheless, the work continued. I even took a "finalish" copy
with me on a flight from Washington, D.C. to New York on Sep-
tember 9, 2001. Two days later the answer to the question I set
out to address in that draft seemed all too clear, and, in addition
to being diverted to other pressing activities, the subject seemed
distasteful to pursue at the time. Recently, however, another of
my former Georgetown Law professors, Allan Mendelsohn,
urged me to resume the effort and so I have. After the morning
of September 11, 2001, it seems that no one doubts that not only
are there times when it is permissible to shoot down a civilian
aircraft, there are times when it is imperative. The question re-
mains, however, when?
I DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAw OF NATIONS: A HISTORICAL AND PER-
SONAL ACCOUNT OF THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN FOREIGN POLICY 9 (1990).
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that an aircraft operating as flight AB1 23 takes off on
a journey requiring a transit across the airspace of Country A.
Country A generally allows civilian aircraft to transit its airspace.
Nevertheless, Country A's law prohibits flying within fifty miles
of its military's headquarters (or, perhaps, its financial center)
or on a course that would intercept that restricted area without
prior authorization.
The air traffic controllers in Country A soon realize that
Flight AB123 is flying on a course that will cut through the re-
stricted airspace. They, therefore, contact Flight AB123 and di-
rect the pilot to adjust course. After some linguistic difficulties,
the pilot of the aircraft, which is now inside the restricted area,
acknowledges the instruction. The air traffic controllers imme-
diately notice, however, that rather than turning away from the
restricted area, the aircraft has turned the correct number of
degrees, but in the wrong direction and is now heading to the
heart of the restricted area. Country A scrambles two of its
fighter jets to intercept it. Moments later the jets are within vis-
ual range of Flight AB123, but Country A's air traffic controllers
and the pilots of the two jets are unable to establish further com-
munications with it. What options are available to Country A
and most importantly, can it fire on Flight AB123? If so, when?
This Article analyzes that issue and, using the available post-
World War II examples, seeks to determine if there is, in fact,
international law on this point. The first section of this Article
provides a brief overview of the history of commercial aviation,
the relationship of the militaries to that development, as well as
the Chicago Convention. The second section addresses the vari-
ous sources of international law that might provide guidance on
the status of the law in this area with particular emphasis on the
treaties regarding the law of war, non-consensual sources of in-
ternational law, President Tito's letter of August 31, 1946, the
events that gave rise to it, and its subsequent consequences. The
third section reviews the post-World War II incidents involving
the shooting down of civilian aircraft engaged in international
aviation.2 The fourth section reviews what appears to be an
anomaly in this area of law under which the general condemna-
2 It must be noted that while the four aircraft used in the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 were engaged in domestic aviation, how the conclusions
reached in this paper might be applied to those aircraft are addressed infra at
Section VII.
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tion of firing on civilian aircraft does not apply to firing on drug
traffickers. The fifth section presents an analysis of the post-
World War II incidents with a view toward determining if a law
on this subject has been established by practice. The sixth sec-
tion presents proposed criteria for determining when force may
be used against aircraft. Finally, this paper concludes with the
assertion that while a law on this subject has been approached, it
has not yet been established.
I. BACKGROUND
Kites and balloons had been used for military purposes long
before the Wright Brothers' first mechanically powered flight in
1903. 3 The military application for powered flight was, there-
fore, a natural extension. At the same time, because the tech-
nology was so new and perhaps because the range so limited,
the first international efforts at regulation of aviation did not
come about until after World War 1.4 Thus, during the war,
each country was left to its own devices to determine how to
regulate aircraft, military or otherwise, within its airspace.5 In
general, the countries in Europe that remained neutral closed
their airspace to the aircraft of countries participating in the
hostilities.6 In many cases they enforced their policies by firing
on intruding military aircraft.7 While some of the governments
issued standing instructions to give warnings to intruding air-
craft, the Dutch and the Swiss often opened fire without any
warning." Moreover, the Dutch maintained that while a warning
might be given for humanitarian purposes, it was not necessary.'
Thus, the issue regarding when a country may fire on the mili-
tary aircraft of a foreign power with which it is not engaged in
hostilities remained unresolved after the war.
3 Smithsonian Nat'l Air & Space Museum, Milestones of Flight: 1903 Wright
Flyer, http://www.nasm.si.edu/exhibitions/gall00/wrightl903.html (last visited
Nov. 26, 2007). See generally FRED HOWARD, WILBUR AND ORVILLE: A BIOGRAPHY OF
THE WRIGHT BROTHERS (1987) (detailing the lives of the Wright Brothers and
their accomplishments).
4 MAURICE PEARTON, DIPLOMACY, WAR AND TECHNOLOGY SINCE 1830 205 (1984)
(noting how in early aviation there was little distinction between civil and military
aircraft).
5 Id.
6 Oliverj. Lissitzyn, The Treatment of Aerial Intruders in Recent Practice and Interna-
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The 1919 Paris Convention, which was the first significant in-
ternational regulatory response to the nascent international avi-
ation industry,"' concluded with the Convention for the
Regulation of Aerial Navigation"' and did not address the issue
directly. Even for civil aircraft-as a distinction between military
and civilian aircraft had started to form-the Paris Convention
included only one provision requiring a pilot to give a signal of
distress, specified in an annex to the convention, when he be-
came aware that he was flying over a prohibited area, the bound-
aries of which each country could determine for its own
airspace. 12
During World War II, neutral countries generally returned to
the practice they had adopted during World War I, that is, firing
on aircraft from belligerent countries, but generally giving a
warning first.13 That policy remained relatively firm for the du-
ration of the war. 14
While aircraft were used in World War I, World War II truly
demonstrated the overwhelming significance of flight for both
military and civilian use. As a consequence, in 1944, an interna-
tional conference on the regulation of aviation was held in Chi-
cago, Illinois.'5 The result of that effort is the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, commonly known as the "Chicago
Convention.' 6 The Chicago Convention established the first
two of the "Freedoms of the Air:" the right of innocent passage
and the right to land for technical purposes without letting off
or taking on passengers, such as for refueling.' 7 Part II of the
Chicago Convention established the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO),is which evolved into a specialized agency
of the United Nations after the United Nations was created on
10 RICHARD Y. CHUANG, THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION: A
CASE STUDY OF A QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 16 (1972) (noting that
1919 is viewed as the year in which international commercial aviation began).
1 Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation art. 15, Oct. 13, 1919, 11
L.N.T.S. 174.
12 Id.
'3 Lissitzyn, supra note 6, at 567.
14 Id.
15 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
16 Id.
17 Id. arts. 5, 6.
18 See R.I.R. ABEYRATNE, LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL AVIA-
TION 1-11 (1996); THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, LAw-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION 3-12 (1969).
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October 24, 1945.19 The purpose of the ICAO was to facilitate
discussions and negotiations involving legal and technical issues
of international aviation.2 Perhaps the most important task as-
signed to ICAO was to "[p]romote safety of flight in interna-
tional air navigation. '1 1 Two important features should be
noted about the Chicago Convention. First, it does not apply to
military aircraft.22 Second, it specifically provides that "[t]he
contracting States recognize that every State has complete and
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.
23
Thus, like the Paris Convention, the Chicago Convention
does not explicitly address the issue of when a country may fire
on a civilian aircraft, nor does it prohibit doing so. Nonetheless,
it would seem logical that any benefit given to a military aircraft
afortiori must be given to a civilian aircraft. Thus, if the Nether-
lands believed that warning a military aircraft of a belligerent
state that violated its airspace was appropriate on humanitarian
grounds, surely a civilian aircraft should be given at least that
same warning. While perhaps a reasonable inference, such a
principle has not been applied in practice, and there is no au-
thority to that effect.
The question concerning the rules regarding firing on civilian
aircraft can thus only be addressed by examining the law and
the various incidents following World War II. One military ex-
ample is, however, particularly important.
A. PRESIDENT TITO'S LETTER
On August 9, 1946, an unarmed American military transport
aircraft, a C-47, while on a regular flight from Vienna, Austria, to
Udine, Italy, was forced to crash-land in Yugoslavia after having
been fired upon by a Yugoslav fighter plane.24 Ten days later,
Yugoslav fighters shot down another unarmed American mili-
tary transport aircraft with all hands lost. 25
19 See United Nations, Basic Facts About the United Nations, available at
http://www.un.org/aboutun/basicfacts/unorg.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2007).
20 Chicago Convention, supra note 15, art. 44(h).
21 Id.
22 Id. art. 3(a) (providing that "[t]his Convention shall be applicable only to
civil aircraft, and shall not be applicable to state aircraft"); Id. art. 3(b) (providing
that "[a]ircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed to
be state aircraft").
23 Id. art. 1.
24 Lissitzyn, supra note 6, at 569-70.
25 Id. at 570.
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The United States strenuously protested Yugoslavia's actions,
with each side arguing different versions of the events, including
whether the pilot of the second aircraft had refused instructions
to land. 26 Nevertheless, without any admission of wrongdoing,
Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia's president, stated in a letter to the
American Ambassador dated August 31, 1946:
... I have issued orders to our military authorities to the effect
that no transport planes must be fired at any more, even if they
might intentionally fly over our territory without proper clear-
ance, but that in such cases they should be invited to land; if they
refused to do so their identity should be taken and the Yugoslav
Government informed hereof so that any necessary steps could
be undertaken through appropriate channels.27
Yugoslavia subsequently agreed, on humanitarian grounds
and with an explicit denial of responsibility, to pay $30,000 to
the families of each of the five crewmen that died in the August
19 incident.28
While likely unintentional, President Tito established a base-
line for comparison on this issue. Surely if an unarmed military
transport should never be fired upon, it is even more reasonable
that a country should never fire on a civilian aircraft. Even that,
however, has not been the case. The question is, therefore,
what is the international law regarding the shooting down of
civilian aircraft?
II. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Except for Article 3 bis to the Chicago Convention, 29 dis-
cussed below along with its failings, there is no explicit treaty law
on the subject of firing on civilian aircraft. We are, therefore,
left with three further, but related, "sources" of international
law-natural law, jus cogens, and customary international law.
"Natural law" in earlier times was felt to reflect the law as de-
rived from nature, and in earlier writings, generally reflects re-
ligious values. ° It can, however, be summed up as, "a law so
natural that it is to be found in any community, including the
26 Id. at 570-73.
27 15 DEP'T ST. BULL. 505 (1946).
28 Lissitzyn, supra note 6, at 573.
29 See infra section III.F.
3o See, e.g., Rodger D. Citron, The Nuremberg Trials and American Jurisprudence:
The Decline of Legal Realism, The Revival of Natural Law, and the Development of Legal
Process Theory, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 385, 390-91 (2006).
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community of states."" Unfortunately, the examples that we
have, and the legal argumentation that has followed, appears to
imply that, if there is a "natural" law regarding the firing on civil-
ian aircraft, it is not universally recognized.
"Jus cogens," commonly translated as a "peremptory norm, ' 32 is
defined at Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties of 1969:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes
of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general inter-
national law is a norm accepted and recognized by the interna-
tional community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character. 3
Some have suggested that jus cogens is a modern form of natural
law.3 4 The precise meaning of the term nevertheless remains
elusive, not only because there are no universally accepted ex-
amples, but also because there are no examples of Article 53
having been applied to void a treaty.35
It could be argued that the rule against targeting civilian ob-
jects in war, as codified in Article 52 of Protocol I to the Geneva
Convention 36 has passed into being a rule of jus cogens. If we
31 MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 61 (2d ed. 1993).
32 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 876 (8th ed. 2004).
33 Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
34 JANIS, supra note 31, at 63.
35 Id. at 64 (citing Giorgio Gaja, Jus Cogens Beyond the Vienna Convention, 172
HAGUE RECUEIL 271, 286-89 (1981)). There was, however, an application of the
concept by a United States court in Sidernan de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965
F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017 (1993) (citing a number
of international conventions against torture, the court held that Argentina had
implicitly waived its immunity under the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
implying that, at least in the United States, the courts have held that a rule of
treaty law can be so fundamental so as to pass into becoming a peremptory
norm).
s6 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
art. 52, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. The full text of that article is as follows:
1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals.
Civilian objects are all objects which are not military objectives as
defined in paragraph 2.
2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as
objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those ob-
jects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effec-
tive contribution to military action and whose total or partial
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regard that duty as a peremptory norm, surely if there is a prohi-
bition against targeting civilian targets in the conduct of war, a
fortiori they may notbe targeted outside the context of war. The
difficulty with that theory, however, is that it rests on the pre-
sumption that the rule is a peremptory norm, and there is no
authoritative holding to that effect. Moreover, Article 52 of Pro-
tocol I provides exceptions and, as we will see, similar excep-
tions have been claimed in various incidents involving the
shooting down of civilian aircraft.
Customary international law and general principles of inter-
national law are the final sources of international law.3 8 While
not precisely the same, the former looks to the practice of states,
while the latter looks to the general principles of law common
to nations. 9 It is generally held that to be considered customary
international law, a law must satisfy two criteria: first, it must be
in accordance with general international practice; second, the
international community must accept it as law.40
Thus, without an explicit treaty, "natural law," orjus cogens, we
are left to investigate whether there is a common practice or
general principle in international law against the shooting down
of civilian aircraft. To answer that question, we must review the
available cases to see what general principle or principles we
might derive. It is important to note, however, that "[m]ere ab-
stention by states from the exercise of certain powers need not
signify that they regard such exercise as unlawful."41 This senti-
ment was clearly suggested in President Tito's letter, which, de-
spite issuing orders to his military to change their rules
regarding the interception of unarmed aircraft, asserted un-
equivocally that Yugoslavia had done nothing in violation of in-
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling
at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
3. In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated
to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other
dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribu-
tion to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.
Id.
37 See infra Section III.
38 SeeJANIS, supra note 31, at 54-55 (expositing on the subtle differences be-
tween customary international law and general principles of international law).
39 Id.
40 H. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 46-60
(1972); Note, Legal Argumentation in International Crises: The Downing of Korean Air
Lines Hight 007, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1198, 1201 (1984); Michael Akehurst, Custom as
a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 42-52 (1974-1975).
41 Lissitzyn, supra note 6, at 585.
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ternational law, and further agreed to pay damages to the
victims' family, but only on humanitarian grounds.42 Thus, in
reviewing the available examples, it is important to review not
only the reactions of the states involved, but also the rest of the
world.
III. POST-WORLD WAR II INCIDENTS
A. SOVIET UNION-SHOOT DOWN OF FRENCH
COMMERCIAL AIRLINER
On April 29, 1952, MiG-15 jet fighters from the Soviet Union
fired on a French commercial aircraft while it was en route from
West Germany to West Berlin.43 Though the aircraft landed
safely, two of its passengers were injured." The Soviet Union
claimed that the aircraft had deviated from the corridor estab-
lished for such transit and was therefore liable to be fired
upon.45 The Allied High Commissioners of the occupying
forces in Germany filed a joint protest in which they first dis-
puted that the aircraft had deviated from the corridor, but then
went on to state: "Quite apart from these questions of fact, to
fire in any circumstances, even by way of warning, on an un-
armed aircraft in time of peace, wherever that aircraft may be, is
entirely inadmissible and contrary to all standards of civilized
behavior.' '46 The Soviet Union disagreed and refused to pay any
compensation.47
42 Id. at 572-73.
43 John T. Phelps, Contemporary International Legal Issues-Aerial Intrusions by
Civil and Military Aircraft in Time of Peace, 107 MIL. L. REv. 255, 276-277 (1985). It
may be noted that an incident occurred during the previous month, on March
12, 1953, in which MIG-15 aircraft either threatened or fired on a Viking aircraft
operated by British European Airways. See Walter Sullivan, Soviet Regrets R.A.Y
Loss; Shuns Blame But Asks Talks, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 1953, at 1. That incident
had occurred only five days after an incident in which the Soviet Union had shot
down a British Royal Air Force bomber. See id.; Walter Sullivan, Soviet MIG's Down
RA.F Plane, Kill 5 in Berlin Air Lane, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 1953, at 1; R.J. Hill-
house, Cold War Secrets of the Berlin Air Corridor, http://www.international
thrillers.com/secrets/ColdWar/aircorridor.php (last visited Nov. 26, 2007);
David Lednicer, Aircraft Downed During the Cold War and Thereafter, http://
www.silent-warriors.com/shootdown_list.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2007).
44 Phelps, supra note 43, at 277.
45 Id.
46 Lissitzyn, supra note 6, at 574.
47 Phelps, supra note 43, at 277.
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B. CHINA-SHOOT DOWN OF CATHAY PACIFIC FLIGHT
On July 23, 1954, Chinese fighter aircraft fired on a Cathay
Pacific aircraft en route from Bangkok to Hong Kong.4" The
pilot was forced to ditch the aircraft in the sea resulting in the
loss of several lives. 49 The Chinese claimed that the aircraft had
been mistaken for a Nationalist Chinese military aircraft on a
mission to raid a Chinese military base at Port Yulin. 5°' Never-
theless, the Chinese apologized for the incident and agreed to
pay compensation for the resulting losses.5'
The key element of this incident is that the Chinese implied
that had they known that the aircraft was a civilian passenger
aircraft, they would not have fired upon it; that is, the Chinese
viewed the aircraft as a valid military target, and thus their use of
force was not improper. This incident, therefore, will fall in the
same category as the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 discussed
below.52
C. BULGARIA-SHOOT DoWN OF ISRAELI EL AL PASSENGER JET
On July 27, 1955, Flight L402 operated by El Al, the State of
Israel's national airline, was shot down by Bulgarian jet fighters
while en route from Vienna, Austria to Tel Aviv, Israel.53 The
flight's intended course was to take it along a corridor over Yu-
goslavia near the Bulgarian border.5 4 The aircraft strayed into
Bulgarian airspace and was intercepted by MiG-15 jet fighters,
who ordered it to divert to a military airbase west of Bulgaria's
capital, Sofia.55 The aircraft complied, but as it was making its
approach for landing, the MiGs opened fire. 56 The aircraft
crashed and all fifty-one passengers and seven crew members
were lost.57
This case is particularly unusual because, at first, the Bulga-
rian government claimed to have shot down the aircraft from




52 See infra Section III.G.
53 MARVIN G. GOLDMAN, ET AL., STAR IN THE SKY 51 (1990) (describing the
shooting down of El Al Flight LY402 in the context of the history of El Al);
Phelps, supra note 43, at 279.
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the ground because they could not identify it.58 Three days
later, an Israeli investigation team was permitted to examine the
wreckage. 59 They immediately found that the fighter aircraft
had shot down the El Al aircraft; that is, it was downed with air-
to-air rather than surface-to-air munitions.60 In light of that, on
August 3, just seven days after the incident, Bulgaria reversed
itself.6I They admitted that the aircraft had been shot down by
its fighter aircraft and offered to pay compensation, but now
claimed that its fighters had only fired after the pilot of the
downed aircraft had ignored instructions to land.62 Shortly
thereafter, Bulgaria changed its position yet again, disclaiming
all responsibility, but proposed to make ex gratia payments in
Bulgarian currency.6 3
D. ISRAEL-SHOOT DowN OF LIBYAN AIRLINES PASSENGER JET
On February 21, 1973, Israeli fighter jets fired on a Libyan
airliner that was over one hundred miles off-course, killing 108
passengers.64 It was undisputed that the Israeli fighter pilots
had signaled the Libyan pilot to land, but despite those warn-
ings, he had refused.6 5 Later, the Libyan co-pilot acknowledged
that he and the pilot were aware that the Israelis wanted them to
land, but decided not to comply because of the poor relations
between Israel and Libya.6
The Israeli government defended its actions on three
grounds. First, that they had instructed the pilot to land, but he
had refused.6 7 Second, that the action taken against the jetliner
was intended to force it to land rather than destroy it.68 Third,
that the aircraft had flown over sensitive security locations, and
the pilot's refusal to land only fed into Israeli suspicions that the
aircraft was on a spy mission over Israel's secret air base at Bir





63 Id.; see infra note 102, and accompanying text regarding ex gratia payments.
64 Phelps, supra note 43, at 288.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 289.
68 Id.
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Gafgfa."6 Nevertheless, Israel offered to pay compensation on
humanitarian grounds, that is, ex gratia.7 °
Israel's actions were subsequently condemned by ICAO,
which soundly rejected Israel's claim that this was a matter of
defense of its national security interests in maintaining the se-
crecy of its secret air base.7"
E. SOVIET UNION-SHOOT DOWN OF KOREAN AIRLINES
PASSENGER JET (FLIGHT 902)
One of the lesser-known incidents of military action against a
civilian jet, perhaps because it is overshadowed by the incident
discussed next involving the same parties, occurred on April 20,
1978.72 On that day, Korean Air Lines Flight 902, operating
with a Boeing 707 aircraft while en route from Paris, France to
Seoul, South Korea with a stopover for refueling in Anchorage,
Alaska, lost it way and entered the Soviet Union's airspace. 73 So-
viet fighter jets quickly intercepted the aircraft. 4 It is unclear,
or at least disputed, if the pilots of the fighter jets signaled the
civilian jet, but shortly after the interception, they opened fire
on it. 75 The civilian jet's pilot was fortunately able to land on a
frozen lake about 280 miles south of Murmansk, Russia.76 Of
the ninety-seven passengers and crew, two were killed and thir-
teen were injured.77
The Soviet Union claimed that they believed that the aircraft
was on a spy mission, and, after quickly returning the passen-
gers, refused to pay any compensation.78
F. SOVIET UNION-SHOOT DOWN OF KOREAN AIRLINES
PASSENGER JET (FLIGHT 007) AND ARTICLE 3 BIS TO
THE CHICAGO CONVENTION
While the attack on KAL Flight 902 passed into history with
hardly a second look, another attack on a Korean Airlines flight
- Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 289-90.
72 SEYMOUR M. HERSH, THE TARGET IS DESTROYED: WHAT REALLY HAPPENED TO
FLIGHT 007 AND WHAT AMERICA KNEW ABOUT IT 3 (1986).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 4.
75 Id. at 3-4.
76 Id. at 6.
77 Id. at 7.
78 Id. at 8.
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a little over five years later is no doubt the most famous incident
involving the shooting down of a civilian aircraft.7 9 On Septem-
ber 1, 1983, fighter jets from the Soviet Union shot down Ko-
rean Airlines Flight 007, operated with a Boeing 747-200
aircraft, while en route from New York to Seoul, South Korea,
killing all 269 passengers and crew aboard. 0 The literature on
this incident is plentiful, and includes two books advancing vari-
ous theories as to what really happened."' It is also undisputed
that the global reaction was swift and entirely against the Soviet
Union.8 2 Moreover, a number of countries, including the
United States, imposed various sanctions on the Soviet Union.
8 3
Nevertheless, the Soviet Union claimed that the aircraft had vio-
lated its airspace, speculated that it was on a spy mission, and
denied any liability to the victims' families.8 4
The United Nations Security Council met in a special session
and considered a draft resolution that included the statement
that "such use of armed force against international civil aviation
is incompatible with the norms governing international behav-
ior."8 5 This statement is similar to the joint protest made by the
Allied High Commissioners in 1952.86 It was, however, vetoed
by the Soviet Union. ;
Another United Nations agency, however, was somewhat
more successful in its actions. The membership of ICAO gath-
ered for an emergency meeting on September 15, 1983, just two
weeks after the incident, and on September 17, the IC0 coun-
cil adopted the following resolution:
HAVING CONSIDERED the fact that a Korean Air Lines civil air-
craft was destroyed on September 1, 1983, by Soviet military
aircraft,
79 See generally Legal Argumentation in International Crises: The Downing of Korean
Air Lines Flight 007, supra note 40 (providing an expansive legal analysis of the
KAL 007 incident).
80 Id. at 1198.
81 See generally ALEXANDER DALLIN, BLACK Box: KAL007 AND THE SUPERPOWERS
(1985); HERSH, supra note 72.
82 Phelps, supra note 43, at 257.
83 Id. at 261.
84 GeorgeJ. Church et al., The Price of Isolation, TIME, July 25, 1988, at 34 (not-
ing that the USSR never made any payment in connection with its shooting down
of KAL 007).
85 United Nations Security Council Consideration, 22 I.L.M. 1109, 1110
(1983).
86 See Phelps, supra note 43, at 277.
87 Id. at 262.
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EXPRESSING its deepest sympathy with the families bereaved in
this tragic incident,
URGING the Soviet Union to assist the bereaved families to visit
the site of the incident and to return the bodies of the victims
and their belongings promptly,
DEEPLY DEPLORING the destruction of an aircraft in commer-
cial international service resulting in the loss of 269 innocent
lives,
RECOGNIZING that such use of armed force against interna-
tional civil aviation is incompatible with the norms governing in-
ternational behaviour and elementary considerations of
humanity and with the rules, Standards and Recommended Prac-
tices enshrined in the Chicago Convention and its Annexes and
invokes generally recognized legal consequences,
REAFFIRMING the principle that States, when intercepting civil
aircraft, should not use weapons against them,
CONCERNED that the Soviet Union has not so far acknowl-
edged the paramount importance of the safety and lives of pas-
sengers and crew when dealing with civil aircraft intercepted in
or near its territorial airspace,
EMPHASIZING that this action constitutes a grave threat to the
safety of international civil aviation which makes clear the ur-
gency of undertaking an immediate and full investigation of the
said action and the need for further improvement of procedures
relating to the interception of civil aircraft, with a view to ensur-
ing that such tragic incident does not recur,
(1) DIRECTS the Secretary General to institute an investigation
to determine the facts and technical aspects relating to the flight
and destruction of the aircraft and to provide an interim report
to the Council within 30 days of the adoption of this Resolution
and a complete report during the 110th Session of the
Council [. ] 8
On May 10 of the following year, still reacting to the downing of
KAL 007, the members of the ICAO Assembly unanimously
adopted Article 3 bis to the Chicago Convention, which
provides:
(a) The contracting States recognize that every State must re-
frain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in
flight and that, in case of interception, the lives of persons on
board and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered. This
provision shall not be interpreted as modifying in any way the
rights and obligations of States set forth in the Charter of the
United Nations.
s8 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Consideration, 22 I.L.M.
1149, 1150 (1983); ICAO BULL., Nov. 1983, at 10.
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(b) The contracting States recognize that every State, in the ex-
ercise of its sovereignty, is entitled to require the landing at some
designated airport of a civil aircraft flying above its territory with-
out authority or if there are reasonable grounds to conclude that
it is being used for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of this
Convention; it may also give such aircraft any other instructions
to put an end to such violations. For this purpose, the con-
tracting States may resort to any appropriate means consistent
with relevant rules of international law, including the relevant
provisions of this Convention, specifically paragraph (a) of this
Article. Each contracting State agrees to publish its regulations
in force regarding the interception of civil aircraft.
(c) Every civil aircraft shall comply with an order given in con-
formity with paragraph (b) of this Article. To this end each con-
tracting State shall establish all necessary provisions in its
national laws or regulations to make such compliance mandatory
for any civil aircraft registered in that State or operated by an
operator who has his principal place of business or permanent
residence in that State. Each contracting State shall make any
violation of such applicable laws or regulations punishable by se-
vere penalties and shall submit the case to its competent authori-
ties in accordance with its laws or regulations.
(d) Each contracting State shall take appropriate measures to
prohibit the deliberate use of any civil aircraft registered in that
State or operated by an operator who has his principal place of
business or permanent residence in that State for any purpose
inconsistent with the aims of this Convention. This provision
shall not affect paragraph (a) or derogate from paragraphs (b)
and (c) of this Article.89
The amendment, however, was not ratified by a sufficient num-
ber of ICAO members to take effect until fourteen years later on
October 1, 1998, with two subsequent resolutions of ICAO hav-
ing been adopted urging its ratification by member states.9"
The members of ICAO also published the "Manual Concern-
ing Interception of Civil Aircraft"' that provides guidance to
89 Protocol Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on International
Civil Aviation, May 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 705-07 [hereinafter Article 3 bis].
90 See ICAO, Assembly Resolutions in Force (as of 5 October 2001), at 1-6 to -9, ICAO
Doc. 9790 (1st ed. 2002).
91 See generally ICAO, Manual Concerning Interception of Civil Aircraft, ICAO Doc.
9433-AN/926 (2d ed. 1990). See Yaakov Katz, JAFJets Forced to Buzz US Airliner,
JERUSALEM POST ONLINE EDITION, Apr. 11, 2007, available at http://www.jpost.
com/servlet/Satellite?cid= 1176152772518&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2
FPrinter (reporting on interception by Israeli Air Force fighter jets of a civilian
Continental Airlines flight entering Israeli airspace and failing to contact the Ben
Gurion Airport control tower in accordance with international regulations).
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member states on the interception of civil aircraft with a view
toward avoiding violent incidents.9 2 While helpful, 3 bis is not a
panacea in that the apparently unequivocal bar to the use of
force against civil aircraft in flight in the first sentence is subject
to an all encompassing exception in the second-"This provi-
sion should not be interpreted as modifying in any way the
rights and obligations of States set forth in the Charter of the
United Nations. '93 Article 51 of the Charter of the United Na-
tions provides for each member's right of self-defense.94
G. UNITED STATES-SHOOT DOWN OF IRANIAN AIRLINES
PASSENGERJET (FLIGHT 655)
On July 3, 1988, the U.S.S. Vincennes fired on and destroyed
Iran Air Flight 655, an Airbus A300 en route from Bandar Ab-
bas, Iran, to Dubai.95 All 248 passengers were killed.96 This inci-
dent occurred during an engagement in which Iranian
gunboats had fired on a U.S. helicopter and the Vincennes was
engaged in hostilities with them in the Strait of Hormuz."
While it now seems clear that the incident was caused by a fail-
ure of the Vincennes's computer and tracking systems to properly
identify the aircraft as civilian,9" it seems equally clear that the
United States had no intention of firing on a civilian aircraft and
that it did so only in the course of what it believed to be a com-
bat situation against an enemy military aircraft.9
The downing of Iran Air Flight 655, like that of China's attack
on the Cathay Pacific aircraft on July 23, 1954, was likely an un-
92 It is also notable that on July 29, 1985, the United States, Japan, and the
Soviet Union signed a memorandum of understanding establishing procedures
for handling emergency situations and improving communications among them
to help avoid another incident like the downing of KAL 007. Memorandum of
Understanding Concerning Air Traffic Control, U.S.-Japan-U.S.S.R., July 29,
1985, 25 I.L.M. 74 (1986).
93 Article 3 bis, supra note 89.
94 U.N. Charter art. 51.
95 WILL ROGERS, SHARON ROGERS & GENE GREGSTON, STORM CENTER: THE USS
VINCENNES AND IRAN AIR FLIGHT 655 18-19 (1992) (providing a detailed account
of the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 and its aftermath).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Alexander Cockburn & Ken Silverstein, The System that Brought Down Flight
655, HARPERS, Sept. 1988, at 64 (describing the failings of the electronic equip-
ment that resulted in the downing of Iran Air Flight 655).
99 Id.
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fortunate error.' 0 Thus, like the Chinese, the United States de-
termined that because the incident did not arise from an
improper use of force, the United States had no duty to pay
compensation to the victims' survivors, but would nevertheless
do so on humanitarian grounds.' 0 ' The United States even went
so far as to assert that principles of international law that govern
potential liability for injuries and property damage arising out of
military operations are well-established:
(1) indemnification is not required for injuries or damage inci-
dental to the lawful use of armed force; (2) indemnification is
required where the exercise of armed force is unlawful; and (3)
states may, nevertheless, pay compensation ex gratia without ac-
knowledging, and irrespective of, legal liability.'0 2
The United States extended the issuance of its' position on
this point to note that only the Soviet Union, at least at the time
(and still to this day), did not follow this policy.'0 3 It is likely
that the contrition of the United States allowed it to avoid action
from the international community.
10 4
H. CUBA-SHOOT DoWN OF "BROTHERS TO THE
RESCUE" FLIGHTS
The next incident of a military attack on civilian aircraft oc-
curred on February 24, 1996, when the Cuban Air Force shot
down two unarmed aircraft operated by Brothers to the Rescue,
a Miami-based humanitarian organization engaged in searching
100 Failure to Communicate, TIME, Dec. 1988, at 30 (relating that ICAO had con-
cluded that a failure to communicate had caused the error that caused the shoot-
ing down of Iran Air Flight 655).
101 Robin Wright, U.S. to Pay Iranians Who Lost Kin on Downed Plane, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 1996, at 12 (relating that the United States had agreed to pay $62 million
to the relatives of the 248 passengers who lost their lives in the downing of Iran
Air Flight 655, amounting to approximately $250,000 per victim).
102 Abraham D. Sofear, Compensation of Iranian Airbus Tragedy, 8 DEP'T OF ST.
BULL., Oct. 1988, at 58 (noting that Bulgaria offered to make ex gratia payments
to Israel in 1955, Israel made ex gratia payments to Libya, and China paid com-
pensation for Cathay Pacific).
103 Id. at 59 (noting negatively that only the Soviet Union does not follow this
rule). See also Robert M. Entman, Framing U.S. Coverage of International News: Con-
trasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents, J. Comm., Autumn 1991, at 6,
10 (describing the very different reporting of the KAL 007 and the Iran Air 655
shoot downs).
104 Church, supra note 84, at 34 (discussing how Iran failed to obtain a United
National condemnation of the United States on the shoot down of Iran Air Flight
655).
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for and aiding Cuban refugees in the Straits of Florida. 105 A
third aircraft escaped.' 6 While it is possible that the aircraft
penetrated Cuban airspace, it is clear that Cuba pursued the air-
craft outside of Cuban airspace and shot the two aircraft down
over international waters. 10 7
While, to date, Cuba has refused to acknowledge any wrong-
doing or even offer to make ex gratia payments, the United
States Congress did not remain silent on this issue.18 In an unu-
sual step, less than a month later, on March 12, 1996, Congress
passed a law regarding the incident in which it made a finding
of fact that Cuba's actions were entirely wrongful" 19 and thor-
oughly condemned them.' 1" It is notable that while Cuba main-
tains its position on this matter, when a subsequent civilian
aircraft deliberately penetrated Cuba's airspace, Cuba refrained
from taking military action and instead escorted the aircraft out
of its airspace and pursued diplomatic protests with the United
States."'
I. ETHIOPIA-SHOOT DOWN OF LEARJET
On August 29, 1999, at approximately 5:00 p.m. local time,
the Ethiopian military, apparently without warning, opened fire
on a civilian aircraft that was en route from Naples, Italy, to Jo-
hannesburg, South Africa, having departed from a refueling
stop in Luxor, Egypt, only two hours earlier.' 12 The aircraft had
been tracked by Eritrean air traffic controllers who lost track of
it as it passed near the Eritrea-Ethiopia border." 3 The aircraft
105 See the World Wide Web site maintained by Brother to the Rescue for de-
tailed information regarding the shooting by Cuba of two of its aircraft from their
perspective. Brothers to the Rescue, http://wvw.hermanos.org/ (last visited
Nov. 26, 2007).
106 Id.
107 Cuba the Outlaw, ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 1996, at 20 (describing the incident).
108 Id.
109 22 U.S.C.A. § 6046(a) (West 2004).
110 22 U.S.C.A. § 6046(b) (West 2004).
I"' SeeJane Sutton, U.S. Probes Leaflet Flight Over Havana, REUTERS, Jan. 2, 2000;
Andrew Cawthorne, Havana Reacts With Fury to Pilot's Leaflet Drop, REUTERS, Janu-
ary 3, 2000 (describing incident in which an American pilot dropping anticom-
munist leaflets in Cuba was escorted out of Cuban airspace by Cuban jet fighters).
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was downed, and the flight crew of two, the only people aboard,
were killed."1 4
Ethiopia immediately claimed that it had shot down an Eri-
trean jet.1 5 It soon became clear that not only was the aircraft
not Eritrean, but that the pilot, as required, had filed his flight
plan with the Ethiopian government and had been given per-
mission to fly over Ethiopia." 6 Nevertheless, Ethiopia claimed
that it was "forced" to shoot the aircraft down because it had
entered Ethiopian airspace from Eritrean airspace." 7 Likely be-
cause this incident involved the loss of only two lives, little infor-
mation ever emerged about it. For example, it is not clear if
Ethiopia paid compensation to the families of the two pilots. At
the very least, to give Ethiopia the benefit of the doubt, if China
could have mistaken a Cathay Pacific passenger jet for one be-
longing to the Chinese Nationalists, and the United States could
have mistaken a passenger jet for an attacking fighter, Ethiopia
might well have mistaken the plane that it shot down for an Eri-
trean attack. At the same time, the Ethiopian government ref-
uses to respond to inquiries regarding this incident and whether
it made any payments to the pilots' families.118
J. ISRAEL-SHOOT DOWN OF CESSNA 152
On May 24, 2001, an unlicensed student at a pilot school in
Lebanon absconded with a Cessna 152 aircraft and flew it
through a restricted military zone in Lebanon and then passed
into Israel.119 Israel, on high alert for terrorist attacks on the
114 Another Week, FIN. MAIL (S. Mr.), Sept. 10, 1999, at 6 (noting that the owners
of the jet insist that a valid flight plan had been filed and denies that the plane
was in a no-fly zone).
115 Id.
116 Eritrean News Agency Daily Update, AFR. NEWS, Sept. 6, 1999 (claiming that
the government of Ethiopia had shot down the aircraft despite having given per-
mission to fly over Ethiopia because it entered Ethiopian airspace from Eritrean
airspace).
117 Id.
I'l Over the course of eight months in 2006 and 2007, your author made nu-
merous efforts to obtain a reply on this subject from the Ethiopian Embassy to
the United States. Despite assurances that a reply would be provided, none was.
119 See Brent Sadler, Israel Shoots Down Light Aircraft, CNN.com, May 24, 2001,
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/meast/05/24/israel.plane/index.html;
Israel Shoots Down Lebanese Civilian Plane, ASSOCIATED PREssJune 19, 2001, http://
www.usatoday.com/news/world/mideast/2001-05-24-planeshotdown.htm; Israel
Shoots Down 'Suicide'Plane, IRISH EXAMINER, May 26, 2001, http://archives.tcm.ie/
irishexaminer/2001/05/26/story3927.asp (characterizing the flights as possible
terrorist attack).
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anniversary of its withdrawal of troops from southern Lebanon,
immediately began tracking the aircraft using jet aircraft and
helicopters. 120 The Israelis established radio contact with the
aircraft and made repeated efforts to communicate with the pi-
lot. 12 1 The pilot, however, refused to respond or identify him-
self.' 22 The Israeli pilots made eye contact with the pilot and
fired a warning shot across his path. 12 A few minutes later, hav-
ing failed to make contact with the pilot, and as the plane was
approaching a populated area, the Israelis shot the aircraft
down safely over a beach near the town of Mikhmoret in North-
ern Israel with much of the wreckage landing on its own naval
training facility. 124
Given that the pilot of the aircraft, the only individual aboard,
was engaged in nefarious and perhaps terrorist activities, and
that there was no dispute even from Lebanese authorities that
he had stolen the aircraft, 125 Israel's conduct was not questioned
in the international media or by ICAO.
K. UKRAINE-SHOOT DOWN OF TUPOLEV 154
On October 4, 2001, a Tupolev Tu-154 en route from Tel
Aviv, Israel, to Novosibirsk, Siberia exploded and crashed in to
the Black Sea with all hands, sixty-six passengers and twelve
crew, lost.12 6 The Ukraine government initially denied any in-
volvement in the incident.127 Nevertheless, over the next twenty-
one days of investigations, including analysis of data from spy
satellites operated by the United States, it became clear that the
aircraft had been shot down by a Ukrainian long-range surface-
to-air missile. 28  By October 21, Ukraine had accepted
responsibility. 129






126 Michael Wines, 76 on Board Perish as Jet from Israel Explodes Off Russia, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 2001, at Al.
127 Id.
128 Michael Wines, Ukraine Defense Chief Resigns Over Downing of Passenger Jet,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2001, at A8. See alsoJohn J. Lumpkin, U.S. Intelligence Believes
Ukrainian Surface-To-Air Missile Brought Down Airliner, AsSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 5,
2001.
129 Wines, supra note 128.
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In November 2003, Ukraine and Israel signed an agreement
under which Ukraine paid $200,000 to the family of each of the
forty Israeli citizens that had been killed in the accident.13 ° An
agreement under which the same amount was paid to the family
of each of the thirty-eight Russian citizens that had been killed
was signed inJune 2004.131 Thus, Ukraine accepted the general
practice of making payments when its use of force was improper
(or, in this case, erroneous).
lV. SHOOTING DOWN DRUG TRAFFICKERS
The examples cited in Section III of this paper, particularly
the unanimous action in passing and the ultimate entry into
force of Article 3 bis to the Chicago Convention, might lead to
the conclusion that the use of armed force against "innocent"
civilian aircraft is universally condemned by all but the former
Soviet Union and its once client-state, Cuba, despite the fact that
both the Russian Federation and Cuba are now signatories to
Article 3 bis.1 1 2 Nevertheless, it would seem that other nations,
and even the United States, believe that there is at least one
other exception: law enforcement (the example given in Section
IIIJ. regarding Israel's shooting down of a Cessna 152 might be
such an example and Cuba might claim the same justifica-
tion). "' Moreover, contrary to condemnation of the claims of a
national security exception claimed by Israel and the Soviet
Union, who shot down aircraft flying over their territory, this
exception might even extend outside of a country's borders."'
For example, the Peruvian Air Force has been very active in forc-
ing suspected drug traffickers to either land or be shot down. 13 5
130 Russia Agrees Airliner Payout, BBC NEWS, June 14, 2004.
131 Id.
132 See Status of Certain International Air Law Instruments, ICAO J., Sept./Oct.
2005, at 33-36.
133 Steven B. Stokdyk, Comment, Airborne Drug Trafficking Deterrence: Can A
Shootdown Policy Fly ?, 38 UCLA L. RE-,. 1287, 1289-91 (1991) (discussing the plau-
sibility and legality of a policy authorizing the shooting down of aircraft suspected
of engaging in illegal drug trafficking).
134 See Phillip A.Johnson, Shooting Down Drug Traffickers, 72 INT'L L. STUD.-U.S.
NAVAL WAR COLL. 79, 90 (1998) (arguing that shooting down drug traffickers
does not pose a threat to legitimate civilian aircraft and that it is a proper law
enforcement interest rather than self-defense).
135 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., FED. Bu-
REAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., U.S. COAST
GUARD NNICC, DEP'T OF STATE, DEP'T OF DEF., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALI-
ZATION SERV., OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NAT'L NARCOTICS INTELLI-
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It is also notable that the United States, while not engaging in
such activity itself, not only provides financial assistance for such
activities but has also granted immunity to the United States,
agents of the United States, and agents of foreign governments
for actions arising from drug interdiction actions by foreign gov-
ernments when assistance is provided by employees and agents
of the United States.136 The immunity is, however, conditional
on the President of the United States making a finding that the
"country has appropriate procedures in place to protect against
innocent loss of life in the air and on the ground in connection
with such interdiction, which shall at a minimum include effec-
tive means to identify and warn an aircraft before the use of
force is directed against the aircraft."13 7 The President has
made such findings for Columbia'38 and Peru. 3 ' That "finding"
was suspended in April 2001 following the accidental shooting
down of an aircraft in Columbia carrying American missiona-
ries.14° But U.S. assistance for such efforts was reinstated in Au-
gust 2003."l'
We are thus left with a rather odd situation. While the United
States clearly condemns the use of armed force against civilian
aircraft, it directly supports the use of military force against air-
craft suspected of trafficking in illegal drugs-even over interna-
tional waters. 142 Moreover, it does so when similar action would
be prohibited within U.S. airspace, and the U.S. military is pro-
GENCE CONSUMERS COMM. (NNICC), THE SUPPLY OF ILLICIT DRUGS TO THE UNITED
STATES: THE NNICC REPORT 1996 (1996) (noting that the Peruvian Air Force
(FAP) has been authorized to shoot down suspect trafficker aircraft under spe-
cific circumstances, such as when an aircraft flies illegally in Peruvian airspace
and refuses to obey instructions to land, and further noting that the FAP had
seized or downed thirty-nine drug trafficking aircraft in 1995 and that these ef-
forts continue).
136 See 22 U.S.C.A. § 2291-4 (West 2004).
137 Id.
138 Resumption of U.S. Drug Interdiction Assistance to the Government of Co-
lombia, Pres. Det. No. 95-7 of Dec. 1, 1994, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,835, 64,835 (Dec. 15,
1994).
139 Resumption of U.S. Drug Interdiction Assistance to the Government of
Peru, Pres. Det. No. 95-9 of Dec. 8, 1994, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,231, 65,231 (Dec. 19,
1994).
140 See Charles Aldinger, U.S. to Resume Columbia Drug Interdiction Nlights,
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hibited from directly using armed force against civilian aircraft,
even suspected drug traffickers.143
V. IS THERE A RULE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW?
Returning to our example in the Introduction, may Country
A fire on Flight AB123? What if Flight AB123 is actually commit-
ting an act of perfidy as that term is understood in the law of
war, that is, "[a]cts inviting the confidence of an adversary to
lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord,
protection under the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence,"' 44 as pro-
hibited under Article 37 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conven-
tion, 45 and intends to bomb or even deliberately crash into
Country A's military headquarters (or financial center or a sta-
dium full of sports fans)? One author has suggested the criteria
for determining Country A's right to fire on Flight AB123 is de-
termined according to three criteria:
(1) It is necessary to affect a landing for the security of the of-
fended territorial state;
(2) The importance of discontinuing the intrusion by firing
upon the aircraft is in reasonable proportion to the danger to
the territorial state arising from it; and, most importantly,
(3) All other practicable means of discontinuing the intrusion
have been exhausted-the aircraft has refused to comply with
clear and appropriate instructions to return to authorized air-
space or follow interceptors to a designated airfield adequate for
the type of aircraft involved.146
The difficulty with those criteria is that they are subjective at
each step. For example, in regard to (1), only Country A can
determine if Flight AB123's landing is necessary. Israel believed
that its security had been breached by the Libyan aircraft.147 It
had, after all, passed over one of Israel's secret air bases.'48 The
143 Memorandum from Dep't of Justice Legal Counsel to Jamie S. Gorelick,
Deputy Attorney Gen., United States Assistance to Countries that Shoot Down
Civil Aircraft Involved in Drug Trafficking (July 14, 1994), http://www.usdoj.
gov/olc/shootdow.htm (discussing resolution of conflict between agents of the
United States providing assistance to Columbia and Peru on operations involving
the shooting down of aircraft engaged in drug trafficking).
144 Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, supra note 36, art. 37.
145 Id.
146 William J. Hughes, Aerial Intrusions by Civil Airlines and the Use of Force, 45J.
AIR L. & CoM. 595, 620 (1980).
147 Phelps, supra note 43, at 289.
148 Id.
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world community, however, rejected Israel's claim. 4 ' On the
other hand, the world hardly took notice when Israel shot down
the small aircraft that originated in Lebanon and that had re-
fused to even acknowledge communications, let alone land. 5
Moreover, it is not clear that this is an appropriate criteria be-
cause Article 3 bis to the Chicago Convention, which entered
into force long after these three criteria were proposed, grants
any country whose airspace has been violated the right to re-
quire the offending aircraft to land. 15 1
The second criteria is perhaps more subjective than the first.
The danger presented by Flight AB123 is very likely unknown.
Is it simply lost without means of communicating, or is it en-
gaged in a terrorist act? Similarly, presuming that the Soviet
Union truly believed that Korean Air Lines Flight 007 was oper-
ating a spy mission,1 52 that belief must still have been speculative
- they could not know for sure until the spy camera was recov-
ered from the wreckage (which never happened).
The issue therefore comes down to a balance between the risk
of taking no action versus the risk of taking military action. In
analyzing that balance, however, based on the examples dis-
cussed in Section III above, the global community is very intoler-
ant of armed action against civilian aircraft. That intolerance is
further demonstrated by the fact that, except for armed action
against drug traffickers, no case in which firing on a civilian air-
craft has been accepted as a favorable decision-although the
Israeli shooting down of the Cessna aircraft after its substantial
efforts to avoid doing so might have passed into the realm of
acceptability.15 Perhaps President Tito did establish a baseline
that, barring perfidious or terrorist appearance or conduct, such
action is never acceptable and must be pursued diplomatically
rather than militarily.'54
VI. A NEW SET OF CRITERIA
It appears that a rule prohibiting the use of force against civil-
ian aircraft sits at the cusp of becoming a norm of international
law. Several items lend weight to this position. The strongest is
the unanimous vote for the adoption of Article 3 bis to the Chi-
149 Id. at 289-90.
150 Israel Shoots Down Lebanese Civilian Plane, supra note 119.
'51 Article 3 bis, supra note 89.
152 Church, supra note 84, at 34.
153 See supra Section lIIJ. and accompanying text.
154 See supra Section I.A. and accompanying text.
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cago Convention and its ultimate entry into force.1 55 Moreover,
in addition to a law prohibiting the use of armed force against
civil aircraft, the further norm of making ex gratia payments on
humanitarian grounds when military force is used with proper
military intent, but unknowingly against a civilian target, has
wide acceptance. 1
56
Nevertheless, several key factors detract from the establish-
ment of a clear rule. The first is that there are fortunately few
cases. Second, even if countries do refrain from taking armed
action against civilian aircraft, such abstention does not necessa-
rily establish a position that they would consider such action
illegal. 157
Given the trend in opposition to the use of armed force
against civilian aircraft, the criteria discussed above appears in-
sufficient, perhaps even incapable of application. An acceptable
set of criteria would have to apply more restrictive successive
standards such as the following:
(1) The country whose airspace has been violated has directed
the offending aircraft to land using generally recognized signals,
such as those specified in the "Manual Concerning Interception
of Civil Aircraft."'158
(2) The offending aircraft continues to violate the airspace of
the offended country, takes no action to land or end the offense,
and there is no apparent reason for the failure to comply, such as
a mechanical or communications problem.
(3) The offended country reasonably perceives a threat from the
offending aircraft that is more than mere speculation, such as
information that the aircraft is probably engaged in an act of ter-
rorism or perfidy159 or is heading into a populated area or to-
ward a strategically significant or particularly vulnerable target.
(4) If the offended country fires on an aircraft in compliance
with criterion (3) and civilians are harmed or killed, the of-
fended country should make ex gratia payments to compensate
the victims or their families, unless upon further investigation it
155 See Article 3 bis, supra note 89, and accompanying text.
156 Sofear, supra note 102, at 58.
157 See THIRLWAY, supra note 40, at 46, and accompanying text.
158 ICAO, Manual Concerning Interception of Civil Aircraft, at 4-8, ICAO Doc.
9433-AN/926 (2d ed. 1990).
159 An aircraft being conclusively determined (as opposed to probably) to be a
threat or engaged in espionage would be treated separately because such an air-
craft would be engaged in an offensive military action to which the offended
country is entitled to respond with force. See Protocol I of the Geneva Conven-
tion, supra note 36, art. 52(2).
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is determined that the aircraft was actually engaged in an act of
perfidy or terrorism.
The above criteria clearly omit reference to firing on aircraft
that are suspected of being used in the trafficking of drugs, an
on-going practice for over fifteen years.160 Nevertheless, it ap-
pears clear that under a strict interpretation of Article 3 bis, such
action would not be permitted for aircraft traveling internation-
ally. Perhaps that is why the United States and Peru have not
ratified Article 3 bis (although Columbia ratified it in 1989).161
VII. APPLICATION TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
On the morning of September 11, 2001, the question of an
aircraft being used in an act of terrorism or perfidy, the third
criteria proposed above, was theoretical. Greater concern lay
with the possibility of an aircraft crashing into a populated area,
which occurred when American Airlines Flight 587 crashed in
Belle Harbor three months later on November 12, 2001.162 By
the end of the day on September 11, 2001-after four aircraft
had been commandeered by terrorists, two of the aircraft
crashed into the World Trade Center in New York City, one
crashed into the Pentagon, and the last was prevented from a
similar fate by the heroic efforts of its passengers who had
learned the fate of the other aircraft-it was no longer theory.'63
While the aircraft involved were all U.S. flag-carrying aircraft op-
erating on domestic routes, the attacks of that day provide a
160 Aldinger, supra note 140.
161 Over the course of seven months in 2006 and 2007 your author made nu-
merous efforts to obtain a statement of the U.S. government's position regarding
3 bis from the U.S. Department of State and, in particular, why the United States
has not ratified it nor even submitted it to the U.S. Senate for its advice and
consent. Other than a stated, but not written, support for 3 bis, which does in-
clude voting in favor of the ICAO resolutions urging its adoption by its members,
no reason for the failure of the United States to adopt Article 3 bis could be
provided. A possible answer is perhaps suggested by United States Assistance to
Countries that Shoot Down Civil Aircraft Involved in Drug Trafficking, supra note
143.
162 See Nat'l Transp. & Safety Bd., American Airlines Flight 587, http://
www.ntsb.gov/Events/2001/AA587/default.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2007).
163 See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 1-14 (2004) [hereinafter
911 COMMISSION REPORT]. See also id. at 4 n.21 (recording that in 1974, a man
attempted to commandeer a plane at Baltimore Washington International Air-
port intending to force the pilots crash into the White House in an effort to kill
president, but the police shot the man, and he then killed himself before the
aircraft took off).
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real-life example against which to test the above criteria-would
it have been appropriate to shoot down those aircraft?
Prior to September 11, 2001, it was understood that an order
to shoot down an aircraft in the United States could come only
from the President. 64 Moreover, it has always been assumed
that the threat presented by such an aircraft would originate
outside of the United States allowing ample time to obtain the
necessary authority and dispatch the appropriate resources. 165
Nevertheless, over the course of the morning of September 11,
2001, while orders regarding protocol for shooting down civilian
aircraft that failed to follow instructions were communicated,
the necessary resources were not dispatched until at least one-
half hour after all four aircraft had crashed. 66
Applying the above criteria to the situation on the morning of
September 11, 2001, allows us to determine if these criteria
would help yield a useful direction. Applying the first and sec-
ond criteria-that the aircraft has been directed to land and
that the violation continues-we find that on three of the air-
craft the transponders had been turned off, the code had been
changed on the fourth, and that all communications had been
cut off. 1 67 Thus, tracing the aircraft and communicating with
the pilots had been rendered impossible. Therefore, it is the
third criterion-that the offended country reasonably perceives
a threat-that poses the question that must be answered.
From the outset, it must be noted that actual armed action
against any of the aircraft that were hijacked on September 11,
2001, was never really possible. To illustrate, it must be appreci-
ated that the relevant times on that day were when the military
authorities in a position to take armed action became aware of
certain issues, rather than when those issues actually occurred.
For example, the first aircraft hijacked on September 11, 2001,
was American Airlines Flight 11 (AA 11).168 At 8:19 a.m., a flight
attendant notified American Airlines that the aircraft had been
hijacked. 169 Boston Center, the aviation tracking facility, be-
164 Id. at 17 n.98 (noting that such authority was granted, but not applied, in
1999 for use against an aircraft carrying golf star Payne Stewart when all individu-
als aboard lost consciousness). See also, LARRY GUEST, THE PAYNE STEWART STORY
19 (2000).
165 See 911 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 163, at 17.
166 Id.
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came aware of the hijacking at 8:25 a.m., and they notified the
North American Aerospace Defense Command's (NORAD)
Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) at 8:38 a.m. 7 °M Thus, the
relevant information was in the appropriate hands to make a
military response possible only at 8:38 a.m. NEADS scrambled
jets to search for the aircraft at 8:46 a.m., and AA 11 crashed
into the North Tower of the World Trade Center less than a
minute later at 8:46:40 a.m. 7 ' Thus, the opportunity for an
armed response to AA 11 being less than ten minutes, a reasona-
ble opportunity for armed action never really existed. 172 The
second aircraft that was hijacked was United Airlines 175 (UA
175).173 While it crashed into the South Tower of the World
Trade Center at 9:03:11 a.m.,just under seventeen minutes after
AA 11 crashed into the North Tower, New York Center did not
contact NEADS until after the crash. 7 4 The third flight to be
hijacked, American Airlines Flight 77 (AA 77), crashed into the
Pentagon at 9:37:46 a.m. 175 The FAA had advised NEADS that
AA 77 had been hijacked just under four minutes earlier. 76 Fi-
nally, with regard to the fourth hijacked aircraft, United Airlines
Flight 93 (UA 93), which crashed at 10:03:11 a.m., NEADS was
also not informed until just under four minutes after the
crash. 177 Thus, while the crashes occurred over the course of
seventy-seven minutes, a reasonable opportunity for a military
response did not exist.
We are, therefore, left with a hypothetical question based on
the facts of September 11, 2001. Presuming that an armed re-
sponse could be instantaneous, was there sufficient information
available to merit an armed attack on the civilian aircraft hi-
jacked on September 11, 2001? Here the third criterion-that
the offended country reasonably perceives a threat-is helpful.
First, there was the deactivation of or change of the codes on the
transponders. The only reason for such an action would be to
make it more difficult to track the aircraft. Second, the aircraft
had been hijacked. Third, the aircraft were clearly capable of
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 It is notable that at 9:21 a.m., Boston Center informed NEADS that AA 11
was heading for Washington, D.C. and at that notice, NEADS scrambled fighter
jets within three minutes. Id. at 32.
173 Id.
174 Id.
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reaching strategically significant or particularly vulnerable
targets. The 9/11 Commission noted that even UA 93 crashed
only twenty flight minutes away from Washington, D.C., where
the hijackers' likely targets were the Capitol or the White
House. 178 It is possible that a question could have remained at
8:46 a.m., but not at 8:46:40 a.m., when AA 11 crashed into the
North Tower of the World Trade Center. Thus, it would appear
that the proposed criteria would have applied in practice and
reflect the decision reached on September 11, 2001, that if an
aircraft would not follow instructions, it could be fired upon. 179
The final question in this analysis is, presuming that the
United States had shot down any of the aircraft used in the at-
tacks on September 11, 2001, whether the United States would
have had a duty to make ex gratia payments to compensate the
victims or their families. Having determined that the aircraft
were, in fact, engaged in an act of terrorism, it would seem cer-
tain that such payments would not be required with regard to
the terrorists. That, however, leaves open the question of com-
pensation to the innocent passengers. For them it would seem
that the United States, having acted properly in the shooting
down of the aircraft, would not have any liability to make pay-
ment, but using the true definition of ex gratia, such payments
would be appropriate in such a circumstance.
CONCLUSION
While there is no definitive international law that restricts fir-
ing on civilian aircraft,18 0 international law has developed to the
point where, while not universally accepted, there are norms
that are sufficiently widely accepted that the "right" to fire on
aircraft that offend a country's airspace is quite restricted. 1 '
The criteria proposed at the end of Section VI above likely meet
that standard. Moreover, that proposed standard, while quite
178 Id. at 14.
179 Id. at 40.
180 See United States Assistance to Countries that Shoot Down Civil Aircraft In-
volved in Drug Trafficking, supra note 143 (citing but reaching a different con-
clusion from Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Looking Back and Looking Ahead, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 336, 341 n.17 (1989)); Sompong Sucharitkul, Procedure for the Protection of
Civil Aircraft inFlight, 16 Lov. L.A. INT'L & Comp. L.J. 513, 519-20 (1994)); contra
Sompong Sucharitkul, Midterm Review of the UN Decade on International Law, UN
DECADE NEWSL., AM. Soc'v INT'L L., Mar. 22, 1996, available at http://library2.
lawschool.cornell.edu/asil/llmidtrm.htm (asserting without support that 3 bis
represents customary international law).
18, See supra Section V.
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high, balances the humanitarian desire to avoid firing on civil-
ian aircraft against a country's need to protect its security. In
essence, it restricts firing until an analysis of the situation sug-
gests that the aircraft is, in fact, a military threat-permitting the
use of force as a proper defensive action under Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations-or something sufficiently close
to a military threat, that is, a threat to lives from a terrorist plot,
to warrant comparable action.
I4LAS. It
